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Abstract 
The objective of the research reported here is to develop a more flexible and comprehensive 
policy simulation model for imperfectly competitive international agricultural trade with 
various trade and domestic support policies.  The model is a nonlinear imperfectly 
competitive spatial equilibrium model formulated as a MCP.  The model is flexible in that it 
can simulate the economic effects of the following trade policies:  specific duties, ad valorem 
tariffs. tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, prodtiction quotas, 
consumption taxes and price floo 7,  combined with various imperfectly competitive market  'ko  ',  . 
structures.  The usefulness of the model ts demonstrated w%  an application to international 
wheat trade simulated under several alternative scenarios based on proposals of major 
countries as well as the agreement between China and the United States on China's 
participation in the 11'70.  The main empirical findings are as follows.  Keeping the 
committed 1000 support levels under the current WTO agricultural agreements would be 
favorable for wheat producers in  tile European Community and Canada, but harmful to the 
United States w-heat sector.  There would be little structural change in the world wheat trade 
in a case where China joins the WTO, keeping the other countries' policies at the committed 
2000 support levels.  Likewise. little stnlctural change would occur in the case where the new 
WTO agricultural negotiations result in agreements favorable for importing countries. 
However, world wheat trade would drastically change under full trade liberalization.  In this 
case, the European Community switches from the world's leading net exporter to the world's 
leading net importer of wheat.  Also, China and India would become major nct exporting 
countries, and net exports by the United States, Canada, and the Cairns group such as 
Australia and Argentina would expand tinder full trade liberalization. An Economic E~aluation  of the \el+  Agricultural 'Srade hegotiations: A Sonlinear 
Imperfectlg Cornpetithe Spatial Equilibrium Approach 
In  Deceinber 2000, World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries submitted their 
proposals for the forthcoming agricultural negotiations.  It is clear from these proposals that 
there is severe friction between importing and exporting countries, as well as between major 
oligopolistic exporting countries.  The ultimate outcome that is reached will depend upon 
which country or blocks of countries are dominant.  China's participation in the WTO is also 
an important factor affecting the new agreement. 
A tool that is important for each member country in developing negotiation 
strategies for the new agreement i!  a generalized policy silnulation model.  Such lnodels 
estimate the econornic effects of alternative agreements, and, to be useful, must be able to 
adequately incorporate all of the complicated agricultural policy measures s~lch  as tariff-rate 
quotas, and combination of specific duties and ad valorem tariffs.  Policy simulation models 
used by member countries in past international agricultural trade negotiations include 
AGLlNK by OECD, DWOPSIM by Roningen (at USDA), IFPSLM by Ohga and Gehlar (at 
IFPRI), and various Applied General Equilibrium lnodels (e.g., Anderson, rt ul.; Rae and 
Hertel). 
Tire above are static and dynamic models for multi-regional and multi-commodity 
markets.  Some of these models incorporate PSE (Producer Subsidy Equivalents) and CSE 
(Consumer Subsidy Equivalents) as aggregated measures of degree of agricultural support. 
However, these models do not separately incorporate various trade and domestic support 
policies such as specific duties. ud i:alorem tariffs, tariffirate quotas. export subsidies, 
production subsidies. productivn iluotai, consiirnption tnncx mii price floors.  In particular. 
tariff-mte cjuot;is  have bccoine one ofthc inust importan! V1'0  policies. but it has hecn 
difficuli to incorporatc thii policy option inio ihcsc sitnu1i:incoui equation models due to  a non-convergence problem.  In addition, tliese tnodels assutne perfectly coiiipetitive markets, 
which may be probletnatic since most international agricultural markets (e.g., the world 
wheat market) are clearly i~nperfectly  competitive.  Finally, transportation costs hate ignored 
in these simultaneous equatio~i  models, even though transportation costs are important 
wansaction costs, similar to tariffs, and have a major impact on international agricultural 
trade. 
Spatial equilibrium models based on Takayama and Judge have also been applied to 
policy si~nulation  (e.g., Judge and Takaya~na;  Cox, et al.; Zhu, Cox and Chavas).  While these 
models incorporate transportation costs, they can not handle ad valovenl tariffs because they 
were folmulated as quadratic programming problems.  Rutherford introduced nd va1orc.m 
tariffs to the model by reformulating it as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). 
Subsequently, Shono introduced other trade policies such as tariff-rate quotas to her spatial 
equilibrium model.  However, Shono speciiied supply (or marginal cost) and demand 
functions in linear form as a linear complementarity problem (LCP).  Shono's rnodel also 
relaxed the assumption of perfect competition, but under the assumption that all countries 
behave in the same ologopolistic manner.  Both Shono and Rutherford did not introduce 
domestic support policies to their models, although thesc policies influenced ii~ternational 
trade and policy as well. 
The objective of the research reported here is to develop a anore flexible and 
cornprehcnsive policy simulation model for imperfectly competitive international agriculhiral 
trade wit11 \~arious  trade and domestic sitpport policies.  The model is a nonlinear imperfectly 
compeiiti\e spatial equilibrium model formulated as a 2.ICP.  Thc tnodel is ilesible in  that it 
can sin?iiiate the economic e&crs  of the Solloiving rrade policies:  specific duties. iid ~.ciIoi-ciiz 
i:iriffs.  tariff-rate quotas; cxport subsidits. production siihsidies. protlriction qiiot:~~. 
coriiiiitiption taxes and price flooi-5. coii~bi~~cd  with various imperfectly co~i?peiitive  iliarkct 3 
structures. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an application to international 
wheat trade simulated under several alternative scenarios based on proposals of inajor 
countries as well as thc ageenlent between China and the United States on China's 
participation in the WTO. 
'The Model 
Consider international trade among n  (n  2  2)  countries. In each counhy, there are three 
administratively different markets:  (I) a domestic market with no tariffs, (2) an in-quota 
import market with lower tariffs, i.e., the so-called ininimum or current access market, and 
(3) an over-quota import market with higher tariffs.  Products in  the three markets are not 
differentiated by consumers, i.e,, there is only one demand function in each country. 
Consumers in each country are assumed to behave as p~ice-takers.  On the other 
hand, producers in each country are classified into two types:  (I)  a price-taking producer, 
and (2) a producer behaving as a Comot  player who maximizes profits w-ith the expectation 
that his rivals will not change their supply in response to changes in his supply.  Notations 
used in this paper are as follows: 
: quantity produced in countiy  i ; 
Xj  : quantity supplied to domestic market in country i (i -  j  ); 
X,;  :  quantity exported from country  i  to in-quota market in country  j ; 
X  :  quantity exported from country i  to over-quota market in  country  j  ; 
X;'  : quantity exported with export s~~bsidy  iioin country  i  to in-quota market in country j  : 
.Y' : quantity exported with export siibsidy froin country  i  to ii~cr-quota  market in countly 
.I  : P, :  inarkct price in colmntry  j ; 
C: -  C,  (q  1: cost function in country  i ; 
D  -  D,  (P,  1: demand function in country  j ; 
ST;  :  in-quota specific duty rate in country  J ; 
ST; : over-quota specific duty rate in country j ; 
AT," : in-quota ad valorem tariff rate in country .;  ; 
AT: : over-quota ad valovem tariff rate in country j ; 
- 
Xf  :  tariff-rate quota in country J ; 
ESz  :  specific export subsidy in country i ; 
- 
X;'  :  upper limit of subsidized quantity exported in country i ; 
PS, : (specific) producer subsidy in country  i ; 
- 
Y, : production quota in coullhy i ; 
$ : price floor in country j ; 
- 
CT :  (ud  ~i~io~enz)  consumption tax rate in country  1 ; 
TC,  : unit transportation cost from country  i toj  ( i ;r j j; 
TC,; : unit transportation cost inside country i  ( i = j), 
where i  and  j  arc natural numbers, ST" < ST. and AT  < A1-,' . All demand and cost 
functions are assumed to be continr~ousl.; differentiable.  It is also assumed that unit 
transportation costs are constant regardless of  cli~antity  chipped. and there is no fcnvarding 
transport;itioii between countries. 
L:sing  the above notation, the prodiiccr's proili rnaxin~izing  behavior iii coiiritry  i 5 
can be expressed as: 
(4)  )(X?  + x:.  j s X: 
,  ~~, 
- 
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where Y  ,  X,: , X;, X,: ,  X:  and X,;'  are non-negative variables.  Values for TC;  (i -t j) 
and  TCj,  are set to extremely large numbers in order that values for X:  (i t  j), X:,  Xi:, 
.Y,y and X,:'  be zero  In the case %here  country 1 does not haw tire iar~ff-rate  quota 
- 
system, values for ST;.  A?;':  and X"  are zero and over-quota tariff rates,  ST; and AT;, 
are applied to all imports to the country. 
If the producer in country i behaves as a Cournoi player, the Kuhn-Tucker 
optimality conditions for the above maximization problem can be expressed as follows: 6 
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'where q ; (.  ;/,  and ii  :Ire  the I-itgrange tntiltipliers  for cc!nstr:iincs  (2j;  (3).  (I):  and (5). dP  respectivcly.  If the producer in country  i  behaves as a price taker. the tern1 -2  In  the above 
dU 
conditions becomes zero. 
For a producer in country  i , P, is the shadow price for the right to export to the in- 
quota market in country j . Assuming that the market for this right is perfectly competitive 
in  coiintry j ,  prod~icers  in all countries should face the same shadow pricc for this right in 
country j  . 'fhroughout this paper, the coinpetitive shadow price in country j  is expressed as 
. A relatively high shadow price means more expansion of tariff-rate quotas in country j 
is demanded.  The parameters y8  and ~7~  are shadow prices for the right to produce within 
production quotas in country  i ,  and for the right to export within the upper limit of 
subsidized quantity exported in cour~try  i ,  respectively.  Condition (1  I)  shows that the 
relation lo:  _ds  +e  there is any production in country i . Condition (12) shows 
dY 
that if a,  > 0. then total quantity shipped is equal to total quantity produced.  However, this 
condition also allows for excess production even if the marginal cost is positive.  If domestic 
support policies are ignored, as assumed by Rutherford and Shono, overproduction could 
occur only- if the marginal cost is equal to zero. 
As described earlier, the market is divided into three administratively different 
markets in  each country: domestic market, in-quota import market, and over-quota import 
market.  Since it is assumed there is only one demand function for each country, the market 
eqiiilibriiirn condition in  country j  can be cxpresscd as follo~vs: 8 
The spatial equilihriurn rnodel consists of conditions (6)  to (17) fon~ilated  as the MCP.'  The 
Nash equilibrium solution for these conditions is the spatial equilibrium solution.  The 
solution is found by the pathsearch damped Newton method (Ralph; Dirkse and Ferris; 
Anstreicher, Lee and Rutherford). 
Theoretically, introducing the conjectural variations concept into the above model 
can generalize the model to incorporate any degree of market structure from perfect 
competition to monopoly.  However, conjectural variations in the generalized model cannot 
be estimated in the same manner as lwata, or Suzuki. Lenz and Forker, in cases where X, 
X,  . X,,'  .  and X;'  are zero. and tar~ff-rate  quotas and l~mrts  of iubsldi~ed  quantrty exported 
are cffi.ctive.  Therefore, we use the above rnodel without introducing conjectural variations, 
and find plausible market structures by simulating a lot of combinations of producers' 
~narketing  behavior according to Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser. 
An Application 
Because it is one of the most controversial areas of WTO agricultural ilegotialions, the model 
is applied to a policy simulation of international wheat trade.  Five inajor exporting countries 
and areas (United States, Canada, European Union, Australia and Argcntinaj share about 85 
percent of total expoas in the international wheat market.  Therefore, each of these countries 
and areas is assumed to behave as a Coi~rnot  player.  On the other hand, producers in nine 
countries (China, Egypt, india, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria and the 
formcr Soviet Union) are aszuined to behave as price takers in  sitni11:ition. 
Table  1 shows domestic trade and support policies for wheat in each country  'Tariff 
rates and tariff quotas repr-cient levels in  3000 conin~itted  bq  e:~cti  co~intry  iiilder the 117'0 
ngrecinent (CSDA. J:,%S:  l)ohlinan and Ifoffn~an;  WOj. 11 is ;rs,uinecI that specific export 9 
subsidies in 2000, calculated by dividing tlie con~nlitted  value litnit by the committed volume 
limit, can be used within the committed volume limit even though IV1-0 agreements require 
countries to reduce the volume and value of subsidized export (WTO; Dohl~nan  and 
kfoffman).  China's trade and domestic support policies represent levels applied in  1998 
because it is currently a non-WTO member.  Likewise, Russia' s figures in  1998 are used for 
the former USSR.  Specific duty rates and export subsidies are converted into U.S. dollars by 
using exchange rates at the end of 1998 (UX; Bank of Japan). 
The WTO agreements also require countries to reduce the total Aggregate Measure 
of Support (AMS) as opposed to the colnmodity-specific AMS.  tlowever, instead of AMS, 
we rise the nnit PSE (converted into U.S. dollars) for wheat in  1998 (OECD) as (specific) 
production subsidies because we are focusing only on wheat trade.*ecause the unit PSE in 
1998 is not available for these countries and areas, the unit PSE's for Argentina, China, 
Egypt, India, Nigeria and the former USSR are. respectively, for the years 1992. 1992, 1992, 
1990, 1989 and 1990 (USDA, ERS). 
Floor prices for wheat converted into 1J.S. dollars are set at the intenention price in 
the European Community, the administrated price in Japan and Mexico, and the loan rate in 
the United States (OE'CD).  Although price floors are set at producer prices, this model sets 
the price floor at the border price in each country and area by using the relationship that the 
border price is equal to the producer price ininus unit hfPS (or Market Price Support).  In 
each country and area with production quotas, the quantity produced in 1999 ')((JSl)A,  EKS) is 
used as a proxq- for the volume of productinn quotas.  The consumption tax rate in 2000 is 
useci in each country anii area. 
For ail empirical application of the iiiiiilel, dzintrnd and in~,-erse  marginal cost 
fitnctiorrs in  each eountsy ant1 area are iimplilied and specified ;is follou,: where DD  and  ;Vj are quantity dellianded and population in country  j  .  respectively;  YY . 
4,,  and PC  are yield, cultivated area and marginal cost in country i,  respectively; and a>, 
h, , c ,  and  ci  are parameters 
Per capita demand functions are specified in a linear form for the following reason. 
In this application, many combinations of producers'  marketing behavior are simulated in 
order to find a good proxy for the actual market structuse.  In a case where producers in all 
coiintries and areas form a coalition to monopolize the international markets, the demand 
must be price-elastic in all markets.  If a demand f~~nction  with an inelastic constant elasticity 
is ~ised  in the model, there is no collusive solution.  Therefore, we use a linear demand 
function, which is one functional Sorm with variable price elasticities. 
Border prices (OECD; USDA, ESS) are used as market prices for calculating linear 
demand functions in each country and ai-ca. Prices for the same years as those for PSE are 
used for Argentina, China, Egypt, India, Nigeria and the former USSR.  1998 prices are used 
for other countries and areas, deflating by implicit deflators.  Do~nestic  consumption (USDA, 
EKS) and population (FAO) are used to calculate the per capita demand in each country and 
area.  Per capita demand functions are calculated using these data and long-run price 
clasticics for per capita wheat demand for human uses estimated by Ohga and Yanagishima. 
As shown in table 2, multiplying the per capita demand functions by the latest (1999) 
estimates of population yields the aggregate wheat demand function for each country and 
area. 
Prodricer prices (OfC'iI: ilSDh, I-SS), deflating by implicit deflators. arc used as 
!??orgiiial  costs in each country and area.  Ihe  ciilli\ated  arm iiata comes froin 0I:CD.  'The I I 
data years for both producer prices and cultivated areas are the same as the border prices. 
Cultivated areas' response functions to marginal costs are calculated using thesc data and 
long-rirn price elasticities of the cultivated area cstirnated by Ohga and Yanagishima.  ,As 
shown in table 2, multiplying the response functions by the latest (1999) estimates of yield 
(USDA, ERS) provides the inverse marginal cost function in each country and area. 
Grains are usually transported by ship.  The main type of ship used is the bulk 
carrier (called the Panarnax type). Transportation is occasional and supply and demand of the 
beam determines the freight.  Assunling that the unit transportation cost is constant regardless 
of shipping volume, we estimate the unit transportation costs between ports in each country 
and area as follows: The main port in each country and area, and the shortest route usually 
taken by merchant ships is selected.  The distance of the route between ports is calculated in 
terms of nautical miles. The freight per metric ton and per nautical mile between New 
Orleans and Tokyo is calculated, based on the information that the freight cost for grains 
between the U.S. Gulf Coast and Japan by bulk carrier (Panamax type) is US$22.4 on 
average from 1994 to 1999 (Clarkson).  As shown in table 3, multiplying the calculated 
freight cost per metric ton and per nautical mile by the distance of each route provides with 
the unit transportation costs among the countries and areas.  On the other hand, the unit 
transportation cost inside each country and area is assumed to he zero. 
Four scenarios are simulated based on current proposals for the new WTO 
agricultural negotiations from major countries, and the agreement between China and the 
United States on China's participation in the WTO (see table 4).  The four scenarios arc 
representative ot'a wide range of possible outcornes fur the new trade agreements, ranging 
from no change to pn:poials  favoring importing couniriei to proposals favoring exporting 
coi~otries. 
Scenario I i$  the !use scenario that rrprcsctits tile coinmitied 2000 levels of ir.idt. I? 
and domestic support policies under the current WTO agricultt~ral  agreetnents.  This scenario 
is indicative of the current ~narket  situation for world wheat trade.  The in-quota ad  vulilrem 
tariff rate in Japan is assumed to be 20 pcrcent. and in Mexico and the United States only 
specific duties are imposed on over-quota imports.  It is also assumed that trade and domestic 
policies in China and the former USSR shown in table 1 remain unchanged.  All levels of 
other domestic policies, population, yield and unit transportation costs shown in tables I  to 3 
are used.  Note that population, yield and unit transportation costs are also used in scenarios 2 
to 4. 
Under Scenario 2, it is assumed that China joins the WTO and all other trade and 
domestic support policies are the same as Scenario 1. Trade policies in China are assumed to 
be the committed levels for 2004 based on the 1999 agreement between China and the United 
States. That is, China establishes 9.636 million metric tons of tariff-rate quotas, and sets the 
in-quota ad ~~alorenz  tariff rate at one percent and the over-quota ad valorem tariff rate at 65 
percent.  China's domestic policies shown in table 1 are used in this scenario. 
Scenarios 3 and 4 represent the mo& extreme outcomes for the negotiations. 
Scenario 3 assumes that the new WTO agricultural negotiations result in azreements 
favorable for exporting countries.  This scenario is close to full trade liberalization since all 
trade and domestic support policies except consumption taxes are eliminated in all countries 
and areas.  On the other hand. in Scenario 4,  it is assumed that the new WTO agricultural 
negotiations result in agreements favorable for importing countries.  Here it is assumed that 
export subsidies are eliminated, the tariff-rate quotas are eliminated. and the current over- 
ijiiota tariffs arc iimposed on all imports.  The current domestic support policies are assumed 
to senlain unchanged in all counrrics arid areas. 
The Results 13 
'Fable  5 sbo\vs the spatial equilibrium solution for scenario 1. First. we solved scenario I 
assiiining three different market structures:  (I)  a case where producers in all co~tntries  and 
areas behave as a pricc taker, (2) a case where they forn~  a coalition to monopolize the 
international markets, and (3) a case where they behave as a Coumot player.  Although 
solutions in the above three cases are not shown, they were not realistic solutions.  For 
example, the first and second cases resulted in highly simplistic world trade structures.  The 
second and third cases resulted in extremely high market prices.  As shown in table 5, the 
solution that was the closest to the actual world wheat trade strucmre was the case %,here 
producers in Argentina, Australia, Canada, European Community and the United States are 
Coumot players, and producers in the other nine countries and areas are price takers. 
Therefore, we used the fifth case as the basic market stmcture for simulating all four 
scenarios. 
The results for the base scenario where the committed 2000 levels remain the same 
are displayed in Table 5.  In this situation, the European Community, United States, and 
Canada are the largest net exporters (net exports of 18.3, 17.6, and 15.2 million metric tons, 
respectively).  Total word trade is almost 120 million metric tons.  While the European 
Community is the world's largest net exporter of wheat in this scenario, it is clear that the 
European Community has a high degree of domestic market protection.  The high domestic 
intervention price for wheat in the European Community results in a large alnount of surplus 
stocks, which totals almost 17 million metric tons in the base scenario.  Consequentlq; there is 
tren~endous  pressure to rcduce the size of government stocks through large export subsidies 
(S1.363 inillion in  the base case). "it the same time. the relati\ely high market wheat price 
makes the European Ctirnrniinit) a particular!!  attracti~e  ~narkct  to otl~er  wheat exportcrs. 
This is also retlected in  the results by the high sh;idoi\. price for export rights into this market 
is!  13.hO per iiizlric iotrj.  I'hus. in spite of\!-TO  prcisi!rc to expand tariffli-ate cjiiora~,  tht: 14 
Eiiropcan Community has a strong incentive to restrict wheat imports; as is the case in this 
scenario. 
A similar situation exists in Canada. which also has a high degree of domestic 
protection in the base scenario.  150%-ever,  Canada supports its wheat market though a price 
discrimination scheme operated by the Canadian \%%eat Board.  Price discrimination includes 
a higher domestic price and a lower export price for wheat, with producers receiving a 
weighted-average price based on market utilization.  Indeed, Canadian producers receive the 
highest market price for wheat in this scenario of any country ($1  89.28).  The shadow price 
for the right to export into Canada is almost as high as the European Community ($105.99). 
As was true for the European Community. the results of the base scenario suggest that 
Canada has an economic incentive to resist expansion of tariff-rate quotas. 
On the other hand, the United States has a relatively low degree of protection for its 
wheat market.  Second only lo the European Community in terms of net exports, the United 
States has one of the lowest wheat market prices among all the exporters (almost one-half the 
market price of Canada and the European Community).  It is clear that the United States 
should favor expansion of tariff-rate quotas in the fuhlre trade negotiations. 
The simulation results for Scenario 2 are reported in Table 6, where China is part of 
the WTO and all other member countries are committed to 2000 support levels.  This 
scenario does not result in drastically different results from the previous scenario, except that 
China uould become a net importing country by increasing imports to its upper lin~it  of 
tariftlrate quutas.  Consequently. total \rorld wheat trade increases in this scenario from 120 
to  129 million metric tons.  Howevcr. there is little change in rnarket prices, and no other 
significani ,\tmctiiral changes in the world irhzat tradc in this case. 
\iot oi~spricingiy,  the world \vhe;ct trade situation would change consiiicrahiy under 
liill tr;iiie liberalization (all tradc and tlomeitic support policies exc$pt cor~si~~i~prion  tascs are 15 
eliiiiinated iii all countries and areas) reflected by Scenario 3 (reported in Table 7).  Relative 
to the base scenario, \%-orid  wheat trade increases by 47 percent in  this scenario to  176 million 
~~ietric  tons.  L'nder full trade liberalization, the European Community switches from the 
world's largest net exporter to the world's largest net importer of wheat (importing 10 metric 
tons).  The market price for wheat in the European Community would fall by over 25 percent, 
and wheat production decreases by 35 percent compared to the base scenario.  Indeed, the 
European Community wheat sector would suffer the largest losses by full trade liberalization. 
Canada and the United States remain as the largest net exporters of wheat under full 
tradc liberalization.  Relative to the base scenario, Canada actually experiences an increase in 
net exports (from 15.2 million metric tons to 19.3). Trade liberalization results in a 23 
percent increase in production.  The higher production results in a 25 percent decrease in the 
market price in Canada.  Net exports from the United States also expand in the full trade 
liberalization case, increasing from 17.6 to 20.2 million metric tons.  Unlike Canada, 
however, the increase in net exports is due to a slightly lower domestic demand, which, in 
turn, is due to a higher domestic wheat price in the United States.  The magnitude of the 
do~ncstic  price increase is 34 percent under this scenario.  Prices become higher in less 
protected exporting countries, like the U.S., Australia and Argentina, becat~se  low export 
prices distorted by various protection measures increase under deregulation, while domestic 
prices become lower in heavily protected countries, like the European Community, Canada, 
and Japan.  Thus, market prices ~vould  be leveled in the whole world by  a freer trade.  Also, 
C:hina and India would become major net exporting countries, and net exports by the Cairns 
group such as L\ustralia and 'Argentina M-ould  expand under full trade liberalization. 
The last sccnario is the opposite of the third, in  that it assul~~es  cxport subsidies and 
tariff-rate quotas arc eli~ninzrtcd,  the cunent over-quota tariffs are imposed on all imports. and 
thc current don~estic  support pulicies arc maintained (7able 4i. in this sccnario. world wheat 16 
trade is the lowest (I  I7 million metric tons). Conrpared with the baseline scenario, the more 
restricted trade barrier scenario results in no significant structural changes in world wheat 
trade.  Table 8 also shows that some importing countries such as Japan and Mexico ;vould 
have larger increases in their domestic production. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we developed a nonlinear spatial equilibrium model for analyzing policy issues 
relating to world trade.  By formulating the model as a mixed complementarity problem, this 
model can incorporate a diverse set of trade and domestic support policies.  For instance, the 
developed model is capable of including the following policies: specific duties, ad valorem 
tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies, production subsidies, production quotas, 
consulnption taxes and price floors.  R.loreover. unlike many previous models that assume a 
perfectly competitive market structure, the model developed here can be combined with 
various imperfectly competitive market structures. 
The usefulness of this model was demonstrated with an application to international 
wheat trade.  The model was simulated under several policy scenarios based on proposals of 
major coi~ntries  on the new WrO agricultural negotiations, and the agreement between China 
and the Cnited States on China's entry to the WTO. 
The main empirical findings are as follows.  Keeping the committed 2000 support 
levels under the current '#TO  agricultural agreements would be favorable for wheat 
producers in the Et~ropean  Community and Canada, but harmful to the United States wheat 
sector. There ~vould  be little structural change in the world wheat trade in a case where China 
joins thc UTO. keeping the other countries' policie.; at the committed 2000 siippori levcis. 
L.ikewiue. iinie trucrural change would occur in the case where thc neu  \\iC)  apriculttiral 
iiegoti:;tii~ii. ~sehult  in agreements fax ortible foi- i!i?por-ting countries.  Howe\cs. ihorld \\heat 17 
trade would drastically change under full trade liberalization.  in this cnse, the European 
Community switches from the world's leading net exporter to the world's leading net 
importer of wheat.  Also, China and lndia would becoi~ie  111ajor net exporting countries: and 
net exports by the United States, Canada. and the Cairns group such as Australia and 
Argentina would expand under full trade liberalization. 
The model can be used for policy simulation of international trade under any other 
intermediate policy scenarios.  Any other products can be incorporated in the model.  Many 
other trade and domestic support policies can also be incorporated in the model, such as 
export taxes, production taxes and consumption subsidies, by rcdefinirrg these policies as 
negative export subsidies, negative production subsidies and negative consumption taxes, 
respectively.  We  also can incorporate price ceilings as well as price floors using the MCP 
formulation.  Moreover, transferring shipments from country to country can be introduced in 
the model by refining it according to Lin and Kawaguchi. References 
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